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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
D. KENT WRIGHT, GERALD A. 
VAN MONDFRANS, PHILLIP K. 
EVANS, and HUGH J. HINTZE, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
KENNETH D. LAWSON, RAY M. 
UNRATH, LEONARD F. ZALLER, 
JAMES E. MITCHELL, and MI-
CHAEL STECHLEY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This action is brought by Plaintiffs who are Directors 
of the Utah Corporation known as Com Tel, Inc. against 
the Defendants each of who claimf to be stockholders in 
Com Tel, Inc. Two of the Defendants, Kenneth D. Law-
son and Ray M. Unrath, were at one time Directors of 
Com Tel, Inc., but not at the time of this incident. On 
the 25th day of September, 1973, letter sponsored by the 
Defendants was published libelling the Plaintiffs. 
Case No. 
13719 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After the Action was filed and before the Defen-
dants answered, a Motion for Summary Judgment was 
filed and argued before the Lower Court, That Court 
granted summary judgment against the Plaintiffs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the judgment of the 
Lower Court remanding the case for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Some background data is necessary in order that 
the issue in this case be properly set forth. 
Com Tel, Inc., a Utah corporation, was organized in 
June, 1969, by Plaintiffs D. Kent Wright, Gerald A. Van 
Mondfrans, and Phillip K. Evans. Each of the above 
has educational backgrounds and training in the elec-
tron field and in the field of business management and 
contracts administration. Mr. Hugh J. Hintze, a member 
of the Bar of this state, joined this group as a Director 
during the course of a public offering of its capital com-
mon stock. The company successfully pursued its busi-
ness affairs in the electronics field continuously after 
its formation in 1969. 
In the fall of 1971, Com Tel became acquainted with 
a company known as Marketing Systems, Inc. (MSI Tel-
evision). The Defendants in this action were each offi-
cers and/or directors of that corporation. A seeming 
community of interest appeared between these two com-
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panies and an acquisition agreement effective January 
10,1972, was negotiated. Defendants Kenneth D. Lawson 
and Ray M. Unrath eventually became officers and di-
rectors of Com Tel, Inc. Marketing Systems, Inc., was 
continued as a wholly owned subsidiary of Com Tel, Inc. 
After a period of approximately fifteen (15) months 
had lapsed, Defendants Lawson and Unrath became 
dissatisfied with the arrangement they had made with 
Com Tel and by August, 1973, both had resigned their 
positions as officers and directors of Com Tel. They 
continued to be stockholders, however. 
On August 30, 1973, Defendants filed an Action 
against the present Plaintiffs and Com Tel, Inc., in the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah 
alleging numerous violations of the Acquisition Agree-
ment, (R. 13-28), and fraudulent violations of the United 
States and the State of Utah Security Acts. Plaintiffs 
claimed $2.5 million in damages. 
On September 10,1973, Com Tel, Inc., held its annual 
meeting of stockholders. This meeting was held at the 
corporate plant and conducted under the direction and 
authority of the four plaintiffs herein. Two of the de-
fendants, Kenneth Lawson and Ray Unrath, attended 
the meeting and were accompanied by two of their at-
torneys. The evidence of Plaintiffs, had this action been 
allowed to go to trial, would be that the conduct of the 
defendants was disruptive and devisive and purposefully 
designed to afford defendants an opportunity to oust the 
management of Com Tel and to place themselves in man-
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agement positions to the detriment of the numerous 
small stockholders of Com Tel, Inc. Sensing this danger, 
the stockholders properly adjourned the meeting sine 
die. 
On September 25, 1973, ten (10) days after the an-
nual meeting, the defendants in thi saction, through their 
counsel, published the defamatory matter (R. 4 through 
10). The entire letter is libelous in its direct and implied 
assertions but, in particular, defendants are accused of 
flagrant legal violations and immoral conduct in connec-
tion with the Com Tel, Inc. annual meeting. Clearly 
this is libelous per se. 
Significantly, the letter demands that action be taken 
within five (5) days of the receipt of the letter and in-
dicates that if the demand is not complied with, all ap-
propriate legal relief wiU be sought. The defendants are 
unaware of any "legal relief" being sought by the defen-
dants and certainly defendants have not at this date filed 
a lawsuit concerning the matters discussed in the letter. 
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in the District Court 
of Salt Lake County, March 19, 1974 (R, 1). On April 
26, 1974, Defendants Lawson and Unrath appeared in the 
action by filing a Motion for Summary judgment (R. 
45). 
The matter was argued before the District Court 
on May 9, 1974 (R. 51). 
There was a formal Order filed (R. 51 and 55) which 
does not reflect the basis of the ruling of the Court. It 
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will not be disputed, however, that the basis of the ruling 
of the Court was that the letter, although libelous, was 
absolutely privileged. 
This case presents the unique opportunity for this 
Court to clarify and redefine the limits of privilege to 
libel made outside the course of judicial proceedings. 
It is the belief of Plaintiffs that the proper resolution 
of the issues of this case will result in a reversal of the 
Summary Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED RE-
VERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFEN-
DANTS. 
Where Summary Judgment has been granted the 
reviewing Court must canvass all of the facts and infer-
ences to be drawn therefrom in favor of the losing party 
in order to determine whether summary procedures were 
appropriate. We would conclude therefore that this 
Court must hold that the letter of September 25, 1973 
was libelous; that it was published; and that it was writ-
ten under the authority and direction of the defendants. 
This leaves the remaining question in this case and 
that is whether the letter was privileged. This was the 
approach taken by defendants in the lower court and 
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the Summary Judgment granted by the Trial Court was 
based upon that premise only. 
The Utah Court has had occasion to treat with this 
problem in at least two cases. The case of Beezley v. 
Hansen, 286 Pacific 2nd 1057, 4 Utah 2nd 64, involved 
a libel suit between two attorneys and the action arose 
during the pendency of a divorce action of the appellant 
William L. Beezley. Defendant Hansen uttered cer-
tain remarks concerning the honesty of statements made 
by Plaintiff Beezley in his presence and in the presence 
of his daughter who was Beezley's estranged wife. Later 
in a deposition of Hansen, the same remarks were made. 
The Court held as follows: 
"Since it appears from the pleadings and affi-
davits that the relationship of attorney and cli-
ent existed at the time the allegedly slanderous 
words were published in the presence of only the 
attorney and his client and pertained to the suit, 
such publication was absolutely privileged and 
the Court did not err in granting the Summary 
Judgment." 
The later case of Western States Title Insurance 
Company v. Warnock, 415 Pacific 2nd 316, 18 Utah 2nd 
70, involved a claim that a letter written by the defen-
dant Warnock and using the term Slander of Title Suit 
and a statement made only to opposing counsel in the 
lawsuit that "Western States Title Insurance Company 
has violated its fiduciary responsibility to them" were 
actionable wrongs. 
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The Court held that the term "slander of title" was 
not actionable absent proof of special damage and in 
addition found that statements made by one counsel to 
another during the course of litigation were matters of 
free and honest communication essential to the judicial 
process and therefore privileged. Although the Court 
did not use the term "privileged" that is the effect of the 
Ruling. 
The question is immediately asked as to why this 
case now under Appeal is any different from the two 
Utah cases cited above. We shall see that the basic and 
distinguishing factors are that in each of the Utah cases 
cited, litigation was pending and the libelous or slander-
ous statements were made as part of and totally within 
the context and issues of the pending litigation. In this 
case there is no litigation. 
It is true that a lawsuit had been filed by the defen-
dants in the Federal Court alleging a breach of contract 
in violation of the state and federal securities laws arising 
out of an agreement of acquisition that had been entered 
into in June of 1972, but the libelous statements in the 
letter of September 10, 1973 are in no way connected 
with that lawsuit and pertain explicitly to allegations of 
wrongdoing of plaintiffs in the conduct of the annual 
Com Tel stockholders' meeting held Setember 10, 1973. 
The question then is whether the doctrine of privi-
lege should be extended to situations where there is liti-
gation pending between the parties, but which involves 
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separately distinct issues. The answer is no and the rea-
son for this is the potention for abuse of the privilege. 
Let us illustrate: Assume that an automobile dealership 
is sued by a customer because of a dispute over a repair 
bill. Further, that the lawyer representing the customer 
acting pursuant to the directions of his client during the 
course of litigation, wrongfully accuses the dealership of 
dishonest dealings in connection with its sales of used 
cars. It is easy to see that if these statements were 
deemed privileged, that would put a tremendous weapon 
in the hands of litigants. Another example would be 
where a merchant sued a customer over an account and 
during the pendency of those proceedings, the customer's 
employer was advised either by the merchant or his at-
torney that merchandise had been stolen from the store 
by the customer. Each of the examples we give demon-
strates a situation where the defamatory statements are 
made amcerning matters totally outside of the scope of 
pending litigation. 
Implicit in the two Utah cases cited above is the 
fundamental legal principle that in order to invoke the 
cloak of absolute privilege, the defamatory statements 
must bear a direct relationship to the issues in the pend-
ing litigation. 
We commend to the Court those cases collected in 
38 A. L. R. 3rd 272. These cases deal with defamatory 
matters contained in pleadings and show the well-estab-
lished principle that defamatory matter is not privileged 
even in a pleading unless it is pertinent to the issues in-
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volved in the case. We quote an example from the anno-
tation: 
"In Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Thomas, (1897, 
C. A. 9 Wash.), 83 F. 803, (applying Washington 
law), an insurance company, in its answer to an 
action brought against it by the beneficiary un-
der a policy, denied the death of the insured 
and alleged as an affirmative defense that the 
beneficiary and her attorneysc had entered into 
an agreement to defruad the company; that such 
beneficiary and her attorneys had no knowledge 
or information of the death of the insured; and 
that they had alleged that the insured was dead 
for the sale purpose of carrying out the con-
spiracy. A libel suit was instituted by one of 
the attorneys against whom these charges had 
been made. The court, in holding that the mat-
ter alleged by the company in its answer was not 
relevant and not privileged, said that the issue 
in the action was whether or not the insurance 
company was liable upon the policy, and that the 
company's defense was that the insured was still 
living, but that instead of relying upon that de-
fense, it attempted to asperse the character of 
the attorneys who were conducting the suit by 
charging them with libelous matter which, if 
true, added in no way to the force of its allega-
tion that the event upon which alone its liability 
was to attach had not occured, namely, the 
death of the insured." 
These cases apply with even greater effect here be-
cause in this case we are not dealing with a pleading, but 
rather a letter which is even further removed from the 
cloak of immunity. 
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The Legislature has spoken on the subject in Title 
45-2-3, U. C. A. 1953: 
UA privileged publication which shall not be con-
sidered as libelous per se is one made . . . (2) 
in any publication of or any statement made in 
any legislative or judicial proceeding, or in any 
other official proceeding authorized by law." 
This statute must be strictly construed and must 
obviously mean that a privilege attains only in or during 
the course of a judicial proceeding and that a privilege 
cannot possibly extend to a letter whidi merely mentions 
a legal proceeding and where the libelous material has 
no relationship whatever to the issues in that pending 
legal proceeding. 
The Summary Judgment granted by the Lower 
Court is silent as to the Court's reasoning. We have 
already discussed one possible basis for the reasoning 
of the Court and have shown it to be fallacious. The 
only other possible argument that can be made in sup-
port of the judgment of the Lower Court is that the libel-
ous letter contains some references to some legal pro-
ceeding to be commenced in the future and therefore the 
letter is immune. The only language in the letter that 
points in this direction is as follows: 
"In the event we are not notified within five 
(5) days from the receipt of this letter of a sat-
isfactory plan of management of Com Tel to 
accomplish the foregoing demands, we shall have 
no alternative but to seek all the appropriate 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
legal relief with respect to accomplishing the 
same." 
This statement in the letter implies that at some 
future time something of a legal nature would be done 
in the event Com Tel failed to comply with the demand. 
We are not advised as to what is meant by "legal relief" 
— Does it mean a lawsuit? Does it mean application to 
an administrative agency? Letters to stockholders? Who 
are the parties? Are they the individual directors or 
Com Tel, Inc. or a combination of both? It must be con-
cluded that language so general in character means very 
little. We can say that it does not appear that a lawsuit 
was contemplated because none has ever been com-
menced. 
The question finally comes down to whether an at-
torney or a party through an attorney can publish a libel 
and escape the consequences thereof if there is mentioned 
in connection with the libel something about "legal relief" 
being sought. If this Court chooses to extend the doctrine 
of privilege that far, another legal weapon is forged for 
the unscrupulous. Assume that a merchant contacts his 
lawyer and tells him to write a letter to someone who has 
given him a check that for some reason or another was 
returned to the merchant on presentment. He is advised 
to tell the person in the letter that he is a bad check 
artist and that the money plus attorney's fees must be 
paid within five days or suit will be commenced. A copy 
of the letter is sent to the person's employer. The man, 
of course, could be perfectly innocent: The bank could 
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have made a mistake; however, the duress and coercion 
upon that person would probably be such that he would 
pay up and be quiet, hopeful that his employer would be 
charitable in his attitude toward the matter. This would 
be particularly so if when the man consulted counsel, 
found out that the letter written about him even though 
libelous per se and untrue was privileged. 
We think it would be wrong for this Court to extend 
the doctrine of privilege as far as it must be extended 
to sustain the ruling of the Lower Court. In so stating, 
we are mindful that this Court has cited with approval 
the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Volume 3, Section 
586, wherein it is stated: 
"An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to 
publish false and defamatory matter of another 
in communications preliminary to a proposed 
judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or 
during the course and as part of the judicial 
proceeding in which it participates as counsel, if 
it has some relation thereto." Beezley v. Hansen, 
supra. 
We are unable to find any case law that supports the 
proposition that a libel by an attorney is privileged if 
made during the preparation for a lawsuit. If it be con-
tended that a lawyer may publish a libel and escape the 
consequences merely by mentioning that some possible 
legal proceeding is contemplated, as is the case here, then 
the law would have gone too far and the public policy that 
it intended to serve would have been subverted. 
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This is where our Court needs to define this matter 
of privilege and strike a fair balance between the public 
policy to be served and the rights of the individual who 
is libeled. We suggest that the mere mention of a legal pro-
ceeding in a demand letter is insufficient to provide im-
munity. The threat of duress and coercion is all too ap-
parent and it is believed that the privilege should not be 
carried that far. The statement in the restatement giving 
protection to counsel and clients who publish a libel in 
connection with a proposed judicial proceeding should 
either be expressly rejected by this Court or confined to 
those situations where the communication is to another 
attorney or a judicial or prosecuting officer. Publication 
of the defamatory matter to those in no way connected 
with the judicial proceeding should not be considered im-
mune. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants appeared in this action without answer-
ing the Complamt, but rather by filing a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The allegations of the Complaint 
are therefore deemed admitted and the sole question be-
fore the Lower Court on the Motion for Summary Judg-
ment was whether the defamatory letter was privileged. 
The ruling of the Lower Court cannot be justified un-
less this Court were to hold: 
1. That since litigation is pending between the 
parties, the defamatory matter is privileged even though 
it is not relevant to any issue in the pending lawsuit, or 
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2. That the defamatory matter is privileged if in the 
letter legal relief is mentioned if demands are not met. 
It is the position of the plaintiffs in this action that 
the bases of the Lower Court's Ruling are not sound and 
that the Summary Judgment should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
By EDWARD M. GARRETT 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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